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Abstract
This survey reviews both theoretical and empirical papers that examine the eco-
nomic e®ects of labour mobility with a particular reference to intra-European migra-
tion. We address three broad sets of issues: ¯rstly, the e®ect that immigration has on
the host country's labour market. Although the possible adverse e®ects that immigra-
tion can have on the wage and employment levels of natives are typically examined,
immigration may also have a role to play in raising skill levels. This leads to the
second broad issue: the e®ect of migration of a particular skill composition on the
long-term (endogenous) growth of the host country. Finally, immigration can have a
major economic impact on the source country. These e®ects can either be positive or
negative depending on the interplay between the e®ects of growth, remittances and
the brain drain.
JEL Classi¯cation: F22, F43
Keywords: migration, factor mobility, economic growth, immigration surplus.
¤Prepared for the second Workshop of the Fifth Framework Programme project \European Enlarge-
ment: The Impact of East-West Migration on Growth and and Employment", Vienna, 6-7th December,
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A Elasticities from Hammermesh 481 Introduction
Immigration is one of the most important issues in the contemporary global economy.1 It
is estimated that over 110 million people now reside outside the country of their birth (
United Nations, 2002). This clearly has major economic and political implications for both
the sending and receiving countries. Coppel et al. (2001) identify four major consequences
of international population movements. Firstly, there is the e®ect that immigration has
on the host country's labour market. Although the possible adverse e®ects that immi-
gration can have on the wage and employment levels of natives are typically examined,
immigration may also have a role to play in reducing skill shortages in certain key sectors
of the economy. Secondly, immigration is likely to in°uence the budgetary position of the
receiving country since the amount recent arrivals receive through health, education and
welfare systems is unlikely to exactly balance the increased tax revenues from new workers.
Thirdly, it is argued that immigration may be a solution to the ageing population prob-
lem that faces many OECD countries. Finally, immigration can have a major economic
impact on the source country. These e®ects can either be negative, in terms of brain
drain (though a brain drain can be bene¯cial if it creates incentives for human capital
investment in the source country), or positive since migrants' remittances are thought to
be an important economic development tool for many labour exporting countries. Also,
in an integrated world economy an increase in the growth driven by innovation bene¯ts
everyone. The overall balance of these e®ects is therefore likely to have a major in°uence
on the immigration policies that are implemented, both in the source and host countries.
In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic e®ects
of international migration, focusing in particular on the in°uence that immigration can
have on growth rates in the host and source countries. Without some restriction, this is
a vast literature so some constraints must be placed on the scope of our survey. First,
we exclude any consideration of papers that study the determinants of migration in an
attempt to understand the pressures for migration or migration equilibria.2 The level
of migration (controlled, or otherwise) is a given throughout this survey. Second, where
1See Zimmermann (1995) for a summary of the migration experiences of European countries in the
post-war period.
2Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) provide a recent review of the determinants of international migration
and the characteristics of immigrants.
1possible our empirical evidence relates to the European migration experience.
We structure the rest of the survey around ¯ve sections: Section 2 reviews previous
surveys in this area. Section 3 examines level e®ects based on the strictly static framework
adopted by Borjas (1995) and reviews papers where migration a®ects transitional but not
long-term growth. Section 4 then looks at a much smaller literature on the e®ects of
migration on long-term growth. The section concludes with results from a current project
involving the authors. Section 5 discusses the policy implications that °ow from the papers
surveyed and Section 6 concludes with some suggestions for future research.
2 Previous Surveys
This section reviews six previous surveys by Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Ghatak, Levine
and Wheatley-Price (1996), Schi® (1996), Steineck (1996), Borjas (1999) and Commander
et al. (2002) concerned with the economic e®ects of migration.
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) is mainly a survey of the empirical literature that ex-
amines the positive bene¯ts of immigration for the host country by looking at possible
complementarities between migrants and native factors, and by investigating the e®ects of
immigration on growth. The paper also discusses theoretical considerations on the issue.
In the theoretical part, they separate analysis of the the closed economy from that of
the open economy analysis. In the closed economy case, the usual substitution and com-
plementarity e®ects take place. In a Heckscher-Ohlin framework (trade with migration),
the authors concentrate on the case in which countries have very di®erent endowments of
factors and factor price equalization does not occur. An increase in unemployment is not
excluded, especially in the European setting. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence for both
the US and Germany ¯nds no signi¯cant detrimental e®ects of immigrants on employment
and wages. In a cross-section analysis, the authors highlight the need to use instrumental
variables to remove the bias due to immigrant choice of location based on labor market
conditions.
Finally, the authors discuss the e®ects of migration on the growth rate of the host
economy. They use a modi¯ed Solow growth model for the theoretical framework (i.e.,
the human capital-augmented Solow-Swan model). The key question here is whether im-
migrants bring enough human capital to o®set their dilution of physical capital in the
2receiving economy. The main limitations of this theoretical framework are: a closed econ-
omy is assumed and the absence of congestion e®ects. From the theoretical point of view,
migrants move to countries with higher wages, but the authors point to possible problems
once there is simultaneity between migration and growth. These problems are studied and
reported in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) which conclude there are insigni¯cant e®ects
of migration on growth. Again, the survey emphasis is placed on the role of human capital
of migrants in determining the growth rate of the host economy.
Ghatak, Levine and Wheatley-Price (1996) present a critical survey of theories of
migration, their welfare and policy implications and their empirical relevance. The Harris-
Todaro model is extended to examine risk averse behaviour within families where the
migration of members of families serves to diversify risk. The welfare implications of the
individual migration decision and government intervention in the form of employment
subsidies is also examined.
In the survey of Schi® (1996) the focus is on the issue of whether trade liberalisation is
a substitute, or not, for migration. Drawing on a paper which subsequently was published
as Lopez and Schi® (1998), he concludes that migration costs and ¯nancing constraints on
unskilled workers lead to complementarities between trade liberalisation and migration.
Complementarity occurs because there are economies of scale and sector speci¯c techno-
logical di®erences. A lowering of tari®s increases the wage in the host country and eases
the ¯nancial constraints for unskilled workers. This leads to more migration of this group
of workers. He concludes that to counteract this, foreign investment or aid is desirable.
Steineck (1996) covers the economic impact of migration looking at the in°uence of
the migration phenomenon on welfare (i.e., the aggregated e®ects and their distribution
among natives). The author presents a survey of the comparative-static factor market
analysis, namely changes in relative factor prices under the assumption that immigrants
are remunerated at their marginal contribution and of the e®ects due to market dis-
tortions, increasing returns etc (i.e., the divergence between remuneration and marginal
contribution). Moreover, he provides a more complete picture by including a dynamic
analysis. The author starts the survey by introducing a basic model with homogeneous
labour (Berry and Soligo, 1969) in which he concludes in favour of the positive e®ects of
migration that are unequally distributed between native capital owners and workers.
3Then some variations of the basic framework are introduced to see how they a®ect
the qualitative results. These extensions are divided in two groups: the ones that do not
contradict its conclusions, as in Rivera-Batiz (1983) and Bohning (1984) (i.e. demand
contribution by immigrants , two or more goods, international capital mobility) and some,
supported by empirical work, that a®ect the general results (i.e. heterogeneous labour
market, short term rigidities in the labour market, increasing returns to scale etc). The
connections between theory and empirical evidence have concentrated on these issues. In
particular, in order to arrive at de¯nitive conclusions regarding the heterogeneous labour
market model, empirical evidence on the degree of substitutability between the di®erent
groups is required. Looking at the most relevant studies, the author concludes that they
show a negligible e®ects of migration on domestic workers (i.e. the degree of substitutabil-
ity between domestic workers and immigrants is low). The author also distinguishes short
run from long run e®ects and claims in favour of a possible increase in unemployment in
the short run, determined by the migration °ow.
Empirical estimates of scale economies in the production sector leads the author to
conclude that they are not relevant in the debate. At the same time, he presents empirical
studies on the e®ect of immigration on the public redistributive system which arrives at
di®erent conclusions. Basically he concluses that ¯nal answers are not possible and a lower
level of aggregation is required.
In the second part of the work, Steineck reports theoretical results and supportive
empirical evidence on the dynamic e®ects of the migration phenomenon. The conclusions
depend very much on how technological progress is modelled. Three cases are distin-
guished:
1. A neo-classical growth model with exogenous technological progress;
2. A neo-classical model in which technological progress is driven by capital intensity
in an ad hoc fashion;
3. An endogenous growth model in which technological progress is driven by both
physical and human capital intensities.
In the ¯rst case, the Steineck concludes in favour of allocative e®ects of migration,
given the assumption that immigrants do not bring any capital along (i.e. a decrease
4in the aggregate capital intensity). In particular, migration shifts the economy to more
labour intensive production which is not negative in its economic impact per se {the shift
depends on the saving rates of immigrants since the returns to capital have risen and
there is space for positive e®ects on the rate of accumulation. On the other hand, in case
two, he shows the presence of clear negative e®ects of migration for the welfare of the
domestic population. Under the assumption that immigrants on average own less capital
per capita than natives, immigration slows down technological progress as well as the rate
of growth of the economy. In the ¯nal case, based on Bretschger (1993), technological
progress depends on individuals' incentive to invest in the R&D sector and to the extent
that migration changes the relative factor prices, it a®ects the rate of progress.3 In this
third case, Steineck concludes by saying that migration has a positive e®ect on growth
through technological progress if it increases the return on R&D investments. This will
occur if migration consists of of skilled workers, thus increasing the skill composition of
the domestic labour force.
The survey by Borjas (1999), focuses on two main aspects of the economic analysis
of immigration, namely the determinants of the immigration decision and the impact
of immigrants on the host country. The ¯rst part investigates the e®ects of migration
on the host country's labour market which are a synthetic presentation of a family of
models already introduced in one of the author's previous works. As in the original work,
the theoretical framework is used to describe the e®ects of migration ¯rstly by assuming
a homogeneous labor market and secondly by including an heterogeneous labor market
analysis. Then, this set of models are used to simulate the impact of immigration on
the US labour market. As in Borjas (1995), the author concludes in favour of a small
impact of migration on US labour market. Section 3.1 below describes these results in
detail. In the second part of the work, Borjas focuses on the empirical research of skill
distribution of immigrants and natives since this is these are the main determinants of
the impact of migration on the host country. He examines the factors that motivate only
some individuals to migrate in a particular country, a theme that lies outside the scope of
this survey.
Borjas concludes the analysis by surveying the attempts to measure the impact of
3A similar model is found in Bretschger (2001), surveyed in section 4.3 below.
5migration on the wage structure in the host country. Most studies have found that immi-
grants have only a small negative impact on the wages and employment of natives. For
example, DeNew and Zimmeramann (1994) estimate thata1p e rc e n tincrease in the
share of foreign labour caused a 4.1 per cent fall in the average hourly wage of all German
workers. This overall e®ect appears to be slightly larger than the estimates produced for
the US (Zimmermann, 1995). Even those studies which make use of quasi-experimental
evidence, such as Card (1990), for the Mariel boatlift of Cubans to Miami, and Hunt
(1992) for the repatriation of Algerians to France, ¯nd that the in°ow of immigrants had
only a small e®ect on the wage and employment levels of native workers. Possible explana-
tions for these ¯ndings are that immigrants are sometimes complements to natives in the
production process, thereby increasing the productivity of natives, immigration creates
extra demand for goods and services and that immigrants may help to erode institutional
constraints such as trade unions (Zimmermann, 1995).
However the main point made by Borjas concerns the necessity to include estimates of
native responses to immigration in the so called \spatial correlations" estimates, namely
correlations between economic outcomes in an area and migration to that area. Two
problems arise from this: immigrants may not been randomly distributed across labor
markets (a positive correlation would simply mean that migrants tend to concentrate in
better performing geographical areas as showed in Friedberg and Hunt, 1995) and natives
may respond to migration by relocating. Given the failure of spatial correlations estimates
to reveal the impact of migration on wages in the host country, the author suggests and
reviews the so-called factor proportions literature. This literature relies on a theoretical
framework and for this reason it has been criticized by some researchers. Nevertheless,
this approach can still say something on the economic impact of migration if we recognize
that it is based on a very speci¯c story. As noted by the author, \the factor proportions
approach does not estimate the impact of immigration on the wage structure; rather , it
simulates the impact". Borjas (2002) applies a di®erent econometric methodology by
analysing the e®ect that immigrants have on the wages of natives by using occupational
rather than geographical clustering. In particular, he ¯nds that by using this approach,
immigrants have a much larger e®ect on wages, an immigrant in°ow that increases the
supply of workers with particular skills by 10 per cent reduces the wages of natives in that
6group by 2-3 per cent and lowers weeks worked by 2 per cent.
The recent survey by Commander et al.(2002) sets out a number of models to address
the brain drain phenomena. In the ¯nal part of the survey, the authors focus on an adapted
`new' economic geography framework. Looking at the brain drain from that perspective,
the phenomenon appears temporary, but with negative welfare e®ects in the periphery
country during the transitional phase.
3 Migration with Exogenous or Zero Growth
3.1 The Immigration Surplus
The `immigration surplus' is the term coined by Borjas (1995) to refer to the increase
in income of the indigenous population of the host country following immigration. The
simplest model to assess the magnitude of the immigration surplus is as follows. Consider
two blocs, East and West, and assume that wages are perfectly °exible and labour markets
clear in both blocs. Further assume that the regions produce the same composite output
and the labour force is equal. Capital of both the physical and human variety are given
and higher in the West. Both average and marginal output per worker are therefore higher
in the West.
Figure 1 shows what happens when migration from East to West occurs. The Eastern
workforce (fully employed by assumption) falls from OA by an amount HA increasing the
Western workforce by the same amount AB=HA. The area under the marginal product
of labour (MPL) curves give total output and the MPL(West) is higher than its Eastern
counterpart MPL(East) because physical and human capital is higher in the West. Ignore
for the moment human capital di®erences; then 1 unit of Eastern labour is equivalent to 1
unit of Western labour. Output then rises by an amount KDBA in the West and falls by
an amount FJAH=ECBA in the East. The net increase in output is therefore given by
the shaded region KDCE. The real wage falls in the West and rises in the East. If there
are costs associated with migration and migrants maximize income net of costs, migration
will cease before wages are equalized. Figure 1 shows the case of factor price equalization
where migration costs are zero and migration leads to equal wage rates. Migrants gain
by an amount EDCJ; non-migrants in the East see total output fall by an amount FJG.
7The original Western population gains by an amount KDE { the immigration surplus.
This constitutes a total gain of wWKDw for Western capital and a loss of wWKEw for
Western workers. Similarly the non-migrants in the East lose by an amount FGJ = EJC;
wFGwE is a gain for Eastern workers and wFJwE is a loss for Eastern captitalists. Thus
the losers are the original Western workers and Eastern capitalists; the winners are the
migrants and Western capitalists.
Borjas (1995) provides rough estimates of the immigration surplus for the US, but
in fact could be any OECD country. Assume ¯rst that all workers, East and West, are
perfect substitutes. Suppose a host workforce N expands to L = N + M where M is the

































where we have put ¢L = M (since all migrants ¯nd employment), s is labour's share of
national income, e is the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the labour force and
m = M
L is the proportion of migrants in the workforce (AB
OB in ¯gure 1).
Given that labour income accounts for around 70 per cent of GDP for most OECD
countries, and just under 10 per cent of the US (or German) workforce are immigrants
and the elasticity of the factor price of labour (capital ¯xed) thought to be around 0:3
(Hamermesh, 1993 see Appendix), Borjas puts s =0 :7 and e = ¡0:3 to arrive at the
pessimistic conclusion that a 10% increase in the workforce through migration increases
US (or German) GDP by only 0.105%. This net gain is accompanied by a 3% fall in the
wage rate and hence a not-insigni¯cant redistribution from labour to capital.
Now consider migration with wage rigidity. The general case of some wage °exibility
which encompasses the case of full °exibility above is illustrated in ¯gure 2, taken from
Levine (1999). The labour supply curves (which, following Layard et al (1992), we refer to
as the `bargained real wage' or BRW curves) and the labour demand curves (the marginal
product of labour, MPL) are shown for the two blocs. Upward-sloping BRW curves are
consistent with a number of theories of wage determination including the monopoly union
model, bargaining, and e±ciency wage theories. OA is the total labour force in East and
West prior to migration (assumed to be equal). As a result of migration equal to HA=AB,
8with some real wage °exibility, the BRW (West) shifts to the right and employment rises
by WW. Similarly the BRW (East) shifts to the left and employment falls by EE. The
welfare implications of East-West migration { which we analyze in more detail in the
next section { can be assessed by comparing the increase in Western output HJWW with
the decrease in the East FGEE. We have illustrated the case where WW, EE and the
real wage °exibility in the two regions are about equal. Then the net output gains are
positive; in general, however, the output e®ects are crucially dependent on the degree of
real wage °exibility in the two labour markets. To work out the immigration surplus,
we put ¢L = ´M where ´ 2 [0;1] encompassing the cases of wage °exibility ´ =1t o





which provides an even more pessimistic outlook for the economic bene¯ts of migration
for host residents.
The analysis up to now has assumed only one type of labour. Suppose now the work-
force in both blocs consists of skilled and unskilled labour and output Y = f(K;L;H)i n
the host country where L and H denotes skilled and unskilled labour respectively. Let
elasticities of factor prices wL and wH be denoted by eLL =
@logwL





@logH . Let the migration rate be m = M
L+H and the post-migration proportion
of skilled labour be h = H
L+H. Let ¯ denote the fraction of skilled workers among im-
migrants and the changes in the skilled and unskilled work-forces following migration be
¢L = ´L(1 ¡ ¯)M and ¢ = ´H¯M where ´i 2 [0;1] are measures of labour market °exi-
bility for the two types of labour. Finally let sL = wLL
Y and sH = wHH
Y be factor shares.











>From the assumed concavity of the production function the immigration surplus can be
shown to be positive. Equation (2) can be used to assess immigration policy that favours
immigrants with or without skill. Borjas (1995) quotes Hamermesh (1993) whose survey
suggests that the factor elasticity is greater for skilled than unskilled workers. Then as this
elasticity rises if immigration consists solely of skilled workers, the immigration surplus
9Figure 1: The Immigration Surplus: °exible wages and one type of labour
Figure 2: The Immigration Surplus: in°exible wages and one type of labour
10can rise substantially depending on original mix of skilled and unskilled workers in the
population.
We can use (2) to to assess immigration policy that favours immigrants with or with-
out skill. Assume Cobb-Douglas production technology (the Appendix shows that this
assumption is consistent with the empirical evidence, at least for aggregated labour).
Then it is easy to show that eLL = ¡(1¡sL), eHH = ¡(1¡sH), eHL = sL and eLH = sH.
Assume total labour's share is as before so that sL+sH = s =0 :7 and that the skilled wage
rate is twice that of the unskilled rate. Further assume that before immigration H = L,
so that h = 1
2 in (2). Figure 2 shows calculations of the immigration surplus as the pro-
portion of immigrants who are skilled varies between ¯ = 0 and ¯ = 1. When ¯ = h = 1
2
we have the same estimate as for the homogeneous case with an immigration surplus just
above 0.1%. As ¯ increases to 1 the immigration surplus rises to 0.5%. Equally as ¯ falls
to zero the immigration surplus rises, but this time by less to 0.36%. Immigration by
workers whose skill composition di®ers from natives raises the immigration surplus, but
by less if the immigrants are less skilled than the average native. The reason for this is
that given ¯xed capital a 1% increase in unskilled labour raises output by sL which is
less than the corresponding increase of sH when immigrants are skilled. For comparison
¯gure 2 also shows the case where there is no capital so that labour shares add to unity
(sL + sH = 1). Then the immigration surplus is zero at ¯ = h = 1
2 and changing the
composition of the workforce to be more or less skilled is symmetrical in its e®ect on the
immigration surplus.4
In the ¯nal part of Borjas (1995) he uses Hamermesh (1993) whose survey suggests
that the factor elasticity elasticity may be greater for skilled than unskilled workers. This
suggests that skilled labour and capital are complements rather than substitutes and
that Cobb-Douglas technology may not be an appropriate when labour is disaggregated.
Then as this complementarity rises, if immigration consists solely of skilled workers, the
immigration surplus can rise substantially depending on the original mix of skilled and
unskilled workers in the population. Thus the analysis of Borjas provides a foundation
for a positive theory of immigration policy and points to a strong economic case for an
immigration policy that favours skilled immigrants.
4This is a standard result in which no bene¯t is derived by natives and migrants trading in factor inputs.






































Figure 3: Immigrant Skills and the Immigration Surplus
Borjas (2001) analyses the immigration surplus in an economy with regional di®er-
ences in marginal product. Compared to the context of a one-region aggregate labour
market where the gains arise because immigrants and natives complement each other,
the author argues that migration improves economic e±ciency by speeding the process of
wage convergence. The idea underlying the paper is simple. Immigration injects into the
economy a group of highly mobile self-selected individuals, namely people ready to move
to exploit economic opportunities in di®erent areas. The assumption underlying the idea
is that native workers respond slowly to wage di®erentials and their marginal product is
not maximized. By moving to the high wage region, immigrants generate two kinds of
bene¯ts for natives. First, they increase national GDP through the standard immigration
surplus; second, they maximize the income that accrues to natives net of migration costs.
The author presents both descriptive analysis and empirical ¯ndings in support of his
intuition. The data refers to US economy, where new immigrants show a high propensity
to cluster in high wage areas. Comparing the case of Europe, there is clear evidence that
migration costs play an important role in slowing down the convergence process and new
immigrants may improve labour market e±ciency.
Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) use the Borjas (1995) analysis to provide simulations
for the e®ect of immigration on the EU economy (as well as for the German and UK
12economies). However, they extend Borjas' analysis introducing the possibility of unem-
ployment for unskilled labour. They estimate that if 1 per cent of EU employment in
1993 immigrates and this consists solely of manual (unskilled) workers then natives gain
by only 0.01 per cent of EU GDP in the full employment scenario. If non-manual (skilled)
workers migrate then the gain to natives increases to 0.03 per cent of EU GDP. They also
estimate that distributional e®ects of immigration and ¯nd that the largest gains accrue
to capital, with a 1 per cent immigration of skilled workers produces gains of 0.22 per
cent of EU GDP. They suggest that non-manual natives will gain if less than 40 per cent
of immigrants are manual and manual natives will gain if less than 70 per cent of immi-
grants are non-manual. In the unemployment scenario, natives can lose as a result of the
immigration of manual workers, if their jobs are displaced. However, the potential gains
from the immigration of non-manual workers in this scenario may be much larger; they
estimate that native workers may gain by up to 6.9 per cent of EU GDP if there is zero
native unemployment. The authors note that the calculated gains are likely to be under-
estimates because they ignore the tax and social security contributions of immigrants as
well as the increase in labour demand that could result from higher consumption levels.
3.2 Migration and Trade
Is the position of a number of policymakers which at the same time advocates free trade,
but restrictions on immigration policy, inconsistent? On the one hand, it is widely recog-
nized that in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H.O.S.) model, trade and migra-
tion are perfect substitutes (i.e. if free trade takes place, it will nullify any incentive to
migrate and vice versa). Under these circumstances, the question of the e®ects of migra-
tion on natives and on the whole economy becomes redundant. Trade liberalization will
decrease and then nullify migratory pressures, both in sending and host countries. On the
other hand, we know this is not the end of the story. Once we move from the perfect com-
petitive framework and/or we introduce some kind of distortions in our economy and/or
allow for di®erent technologies in the host and source countries, the analysis gains new
insights and the links between migration and trade are not trivial.
Some authors claim that the free movements of people di®ers from the movement of
commodities for di®erent reasons. Wellisch and Walz (1997) show why some rich countries
13are reluctant to open their borders to migration after creating a free trade area. They in-
troduce government activities, namely redistribution programs, in a two-country (H.O.S.)
model with unskilled and skilled workers. Following the same lines, Schi® (1998) explains
why free trade might be preferred to free migration by using the concept of social capital.5
People share norms, language and culture, and migration °ows a®ects this social capital
in both the sending and the receiving countries.6 The author concludes that the South (or
East) always gains by freeing trade and the North (or West) by controlling immigration.
The superiority of free trade compared to free migration is also claimed by Davis and
Weinstein (2002) in a Ricardian model where one country (i.e. is technologically superior
in all sectors. With free trade, the country has a monopoly power over its own technology
and migration represents an erosion of this monopoly power. The authors show that world
income rises while natives of the host country unambiguously lose out.
As clearly argued by Venables (1999) , the H-O-S model does not separate out speci¯c
factors for agriculture and industry. Once we introduce this assumption, an increase in an
economy's endowment of one factor might reduce the return to the other. By allowing the
richness of analysis of the speci¯c factors model, Venables shows that the links between
trade and factor mobility are ambiguous. Similarly, Razin and Sadka (2000) and Schi®
(1996), by relaxing some of the H-O-S assumptions, show that free trade might not be
a substitute for migration. Ambiguous e®ects derive from the relaxation of the constant
returns to scale and the identical technologies assumptions. Economies of scale external
and internal7 to ¯rms can generate complementarities between movements of commodities
and movements of people. Similarly, if we assume that technologies are not identical, factor
mobility and commodity trade might complement each other. As pointed out by Razin
and Sadka (2000), the productivity advantage could simply re°ect superiority in terms
of general infrastructure which is certainly the case in the East-West context. Finally,
as mentioned before, complementarity between migration and trade results from a H-O-S
model with migration costs and ¯nancing constraint. In this framework, complementarities
5The set of social norms, culture, values that a®ect the interactions among people and enter the utility
and production functions.
6The author identi¯es four kind of externalities.
7The results driven by the assumption of increasing returns at the level of the ¯rm will be developed
in the next section.
14are more likely the lower the skills and income of potential migrants.
By departing from the standard trade approach Gatsios et al. (1999) analyse the e®ect
of trade liberalization on labour °ow through the e®ects on the provision of some public
good. They show that under quite reasonable conditions, trade liberalization determines
a decrease in the provision of public good and an increase in emigration.
The assumption of increasing returns at the level of the ¯rm8 and transportation cost
are at the basis of the so called `New Economic Geography' models. The complementarities
between trade and migration follows from the presence of positive externalities, namely
agglomeration economies, between individuals' (consumers/workers) and ¯rms' location
decisions. The extension of the Dixit-Stiglitz model into the Economic Geography took
o® with Krugman in the early 90's. In particular, Krugman (1991) shows that the interac-
tions of labour migration and the assumptions of increasing returns and trade costs, create
a tendency for ¯rms and workers to cluster together as areas integrate. Agglomeration
into the `large' region is driven by scale economies, namely plant ¯xed costs of produc-
tion and scale economies through the scale bene¯ts of a larger market9 (i.e., by pecuniary
externalities). At the same time, the ¯xed agricultural population in the periphery is a
centrifugal force working against complete agglomeration in the core. The complemen-
tarity between trade and migration follows from the process of cumulative causation. In
particular, the increase in the number of ¯rms in one region determined by a decrease
in trade costs, makes that region more appealing for individuals (i.e., higher wages and
increase in the number of local varieties) and it generates the above mentioned process of
cumulative causation. Thus by adding imperfect competition, trade liberalization a®ects
the location choices of individual and ¯rms and a core-periphery structure may emerge.
This strong result can be mitigated in di®erent ways. Ludema and Wooton (1999) miti-
gate it by introducing some kind of imperfect mobility (i.e., individuals have preferences
for living in a particular country) or, as suggested by Sapir (1999), by considering a world
where international factor migration depends not only on wage di®erentials but also on
the income level in the sending country. In these cases the Krugman-Venables framework
is still theoretically valid, but more empirical work is required.
8The increasing returns are in the form of monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
9The manufacturing sectors provide their own internal force for local agglomeration by consumers
demand).
15Empirical evidence on the relationship between immigration and trade is limited ,
according to Girma and Yu (2002), this is limited. However, the evidence that does
exist almost exclusively points to a positive impact of immigration on trade between
the immigrants' host and home countries. Two explanations are usually given for this
result. Firstly, immigrants have a preference for products that originate in their home
country and secondly, immigration between two countries reduces the transaction costs of
bilateral trade. The ¯rst of these explanations should only result in an increase in the host
country's imports, whereas both imports and exports would be expected to increase as a
result of the second explanation. Transaction costs could be reduced though a number
of channels. Firstly, trade can be enhanced through the diminution of communication
barriers resulting from immigrants being able to converse with co-linguals in their home
country. Immigrants can also bring with them information about home country products
if these are di®erentiated from those of the host country and hence the cost of obtaining
this information will be reduced. The development of trust through immigrant contacts
can also reduce the costs of negotiating and enforcing trade contracts.
Empirical studies typically use a gravity equation of trade augmented by immigration
data to measure the size and direction of the trade-immigration relationship. Gould (1994)
analyses the impact of immigration on trade between the US and 47 trading partners
between 1970 and 1986. He suggests that the immigrant information e®ects appear to be
stronger for imports and exports of consumer manufactures than for producer goods and
that exports are in°uenced by immigrant links to a greater extent than imports. Head
and Ries (1998) employ a similar methodology to investigate the e®ect that immigration
has on Canadian trade patterns and also ¯nd a signi¯cant relationship between trade
and migration °ows. Furthermore, Wagner et al. (2002) estimate that the average new
immigrant for Canada increases exports to their own country by $312 and increase imports
by $944. Helliwell (1997) reports that migration produces international trade e®ects but
does not have an impact on inter-provincial trade. This may occur because inter-provincial
migrants may not add greatly to the knowledge base that already exists about institutions
and markets in other provinces.
Both Helliwell (1997) and Gould (1994) suggest that there may be decreasing returns to
migration. Girma and Yu (2002) report di®erent results depending on whether immigrants
16originate from Commonwealth or non-Commonwealth countries. They ¯nd that a 10 per
cent increase in the immigrants from non-Commonwealth countries increases bilateral UK
exports by 1.6 per cent and imports by 1 per cent in their static models.10 However, they
do not ¯nd any signi¯cant relationship between immigration and trade for Commonwealth
countries. They interpret these ¯ndings as supporting the view that immigration reduces
the transaction costs of bilateral trade as a result of the immigrant speci¯c knowledge
of foreign markets and social institutions rather than through the personal or business
contacts that immigrants may retain with their home countries. Dunlevy and Hutchison
(1999) also provide historical evidence in favour of the positive impact that immigration
had on imports into the US around the turn of the twentieth century.
3.3 Brain Drain or Gain?
The question of how migration of high skilled a®ects human capital formation and the
average level of human capital in the source and in the destination countries, has come
to command ¯rst order importance in the discussion of both the static and dynamic
consequences of immigration. Miyagiwa (1991) analyzes the brain drain phenomenon in-
troducing increasing returns to scale in the education sector in a model with heterogeneous
workers. The key point of the model is that information is not a public good and that
geographical distances matter. This implies that, the greater the number of educated in
the economy, the greater the income of each educated (i.e. high skill) worker. In the one
country case, the marginal ability is lower than the one chosen by the social planner (i.e.,
there exists a positive externality and too few skilled). In the second part, the author con-
siders two countries with the structure described above, but of di®erent size. In particular,
country A (e.g., US) is bigger than country B (e.g., Taiwan). The author shows that in the
bigger country not only are there a higher number of workers, but also a higher percentage
of the population acquire education. The increasing returns e®ect results in higher wages
for skilled workers in country A and therefore skilled workers from country B have an
incentive to migrate in country A. The author considers two cases. In case 1, all skilled
workers migrate with direct and indirect positive e®ects for the host country. In case 2
10The estimated coe±cients in the dynamic models are lower than those in the static models because it
is argued that trade volume is strongly autoregressive.
17only a proportion of the skilled migrate. Then the e®ects of the brain drain for the source
country are ambiguous. It seems that there is the possibility of a positive brain drain
(i.e., the income of the migrants increase while the ones of the low skilled non-migrant
is kept constant), but it is also possible that only the most gifted gain from opening up
the economy. In fact, given the presence of externalities in education, the migration of
the most gifted negatively depresses the incomes of the `intermediate' individuals forcing
them to migrate. Miyagiwa points to an unequal distribution e®ects of migration on the
smaller size country.
A traditional argument is that migration lowers growth in the source economy when the
highly skilled workers emigrate. Mountford (1997) addresses this question using a model
where human capital is crucial to transitional growth. The amount of human capital in
any period depends on the decision of households to acquire education. The prospect of
higher wages through emigration stimulates the acquisition of human capital and therefore
enhances growth. This e®ect can be stronger than the direct e®ect of emigration. A brain
drain may therefore actually enhance growth in the source economy.
The positive e®ects in terms of human capital formation is also taken up by Stark
Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998) in which conditions for a brain gain are developed,
and by Beine Docquier and Rapoport (2001) in an overlapping generations model of two
period-lived individuals. The former are similar papers that examine the notion that
the gains from prospective migration may increase the human capital levels in the source
country. They show how a positive employment probability in the host country provides an
incentive to increase human capital formation because of higher returns to human capital
overseas (Stark et al., 1998). Migration can therefore contribute to economic development
in the home country, even without the need to assume that migrants return with skills they
have acquired overseas. Stark et al. (1997) conclude that policymakers should consider
not implementing measures that hinder emigration.
In Beine et al (2001), agents with a di®erent level of abilities choose their level of
education in the ¯rst period and supply a ¯xed quantity of labour in the second period.
The productivity of workers depends on the level of the education acquired in the ¯rst
period and on human capital heritage which is assumed equal for all individuals. The
only sector of the economy produces a composite good in a perfectly competitive market
18(constant returns to scale). Basically, the authors assume uncertainty in the probability
of receiving a visa which is equal for individuals with the same level of education. The
education choice for agents is governed by an indi®erence condition between foreign and
domestic returns to capital. One crucial point is that the reservation ability (i.e., the
ability of the marginal agent) is a decreasing function of the probability of migrating. In
other words, if this probability is high more people invest in education with a prospective
to migrate. The so-called ex ante brain e®ect has a positive e®ect in the growth rate of
the economy as a whole and of the source economy as well. On the other hand, the growth
rate of the source economy is negatively a®ected by the proportion of high skilled workers
that migrate -brain drain e®ect. Obviously, the case for negative e®ects of migration in
the source economy arises when the brain drain e®ect dominates while the case for a
bene¯cial brain drain exists if some conditions are satis¯ed. Basically, a brain drain can
be bene¯cial also for the source country if the probability to migrate is high enough to
induce a signi¯cant `brain gain' e®ect, but low enough to avoid a strong drain e®ect.
Becker et al (1990) look at the human capital formation and at the brain drain phe-
nomenon from a di®erent perspective. Basically, they model economic growth assuming
endogenous fertility, but depart from both the Malthusian and neoclassical approaches
by placing investments in human capital at the centre of the analysis. In their economy,
saving across generations takes place through a either a high demand for children and
lower investment for each, or fewer children and higher investment in human capital, and
through investment in physical capital. The basic assumption is that the rate of return
in human capital is high in economies with a higher stock of knowledge. As a result,
economies with a low initial stock of human capital choose large families investing a lim-
ited amount for each child, while countries with a high stock of human capital do the
opposite. This paper contributes to the brain drain literature since it gives an explanation
of why brain drain is from poor to rich countries, namely the ones with higher returns in
education. Moreover, if returns to education are increasing in the stock of knowledge, this
advantage will not disappear.
193.4 Migration and Inequality between Regions
Faini (1996) is more concerned with the convergence and whether migration increases
or decreases inequality between regions. He develops a two-region model of migration.
The population in each region is modelled through a two-period overlapping generations
model. Consumers are endowed with a unit of labour in youth only. In each period
of her life, a consumer i derives utility from a consumable good that is inter-regionally
traded. Consumption is multiplied by a parameter µi ¸ 1 which depends on the location
of the consumer. If she migrates, µi falls to one. This introduces a cost of migration. µ
is allocated between individuals according to a Pareto distribution. The fraction of the
young that will decide not to migrate can then be written as a function of the ratio of
wages in the two regions only, with the added convenience of a constant elasticity ².
There are two sectors of production. Production in the non-traded intermediate com-
modity depends on the capital stock in that sector only with a constant elasticity Á.
Returns to scale are increasing if Á>1. Firms take the cost of capital as given, but
compete in the output market in a Cournot fashion. Production in the traded sector
depends on labour, capital and the non-traded intermediary. Since the latter is produced
at increasing returns to scale, endogenous growth is possible, but Faini con¯nes the anal-
ysis to parameter values for which there is only transitional growth. The capital stock is
composed of the traded commodity but adjustment costs prevent perfect capital mobility
between regions. The interest rate is exogenous and coincides with the discount rate of
consumers. Capital depreciation is complete.
Assume initially that the labour force is identical, but that the initial capital stock is
not the same. First consider the case without migration. In each region the rental rate is a
negative function of the installed capital stock. Therefore the relative rental rate declines
when the relative capital stock increases in the North, leading to an in°ow of capital to
the South. The model is stable and regional convergence occurs. Now assume that there is
labour mobility. The relative rental di®erential depends negatively on the relative capital
stock as before, but it also depends positively on (1 ¡ Á)². Therefore if the degree of
labour mobility is su±ciently high and the returns to scale in the intermediate sector are
su±ciently strong, then the model diverges.
203.5 Migrants' Saving, Remittances and the Duration of Migration
In exogenous growth models with exogenous savings the e®ect of an increase in the savings
rate is to increase the level of per capita capital stock and therefore per capita output. (The
e®ect on per capital consumption is more subtle depending on whether the savings rate is
above or below the `golden rule' that maximizes per capita steady-state consumption { see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Therefore in order to analyse the e®ect of immigration
on transitional growth it is necessary to examine whether immigrants, particularly those
who only stay for short periods, have positive saving rates and if so how these savings
rates compare with those of natives.
Galor and Stark (1990) use an overlapping generation framework to show that mi-
grants have a higher savings ratio than natives if they face a positive probability of return
migration. This is consistent with the life-cycle theory of consumption since migrants may
expect their future income to fall if they have a positive probability of returning to their
home country and will save more to smooth their lifetime levels of consumption. Similarly
Djajic (1989) proposes that temporary migrants have a higher savings ratio because of
their expectations of future price levels in the host and home countries. These two studies
also assume that immigrants have a higher marginal utility of consumption in the home
country.
Karayalcin (1994) argues that temporary migrants save more than natives because
they face a higher rate of interest if there is imperfect capital mobility. A two-country
overlapping generations model is developed to examine the impacts of both temporary and
permanent migration. It is shown that temporary migration is equivalent to international
capital mobility because they produce the same interest rates, output levels and wage
(at every point in time). Both temporary and permanent migration cause world income
and output levels to rise. This is essentially explained by the Borjas-type argument of
labour migrating from the labour abundant low wage country to the host country which
has a higher marginal productivity. Dustmann (1997) extends the previous studies to
incorporate the e®ects of uncertainty. His analysis suggests that if the migrant's variance
of income is higher than natives of the host country then they will save more. However
this result depends on whether any potential random shocks in di®erent time periods are
correlated.
21Rather than holding their savings in the receiving country, migrants may opt to trans-
fer money back to friends and family in the source country in the form of international
remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985) discuss the motives for sending such payments. The
amounts sent abroad are substantial, with World Bank estimates of o±cially recorded
remittances of around $75 billion in 2000 although this is thought to be a signi¯cant
underestimate of the true ¯gure. Therefore it is argued that remittances are a vital devel-
opment tool and source of foreign exchange for many countries. For example, Coppel et
al.(2001) report that remittances were 1.5 times the level of exports of goods and services
in Albania in 1998 and they were equivalent to more 20% of exports in six other countries.
Furthermore, the total amount sent in remittances is thought to far outweigh the net level
of foreign aid that is received from OECD countries (Coppel et al., 2001).
However, there is a debate over the extent to which remittances actually boost the
economy of the source country since more of the income has been used for consumption
purposes and not on investment (see for example Glytsos, 1993). Macmillen (1982) outlines
some of the negative consequences if remittances are used in this way. These include an
increase in the price level and imports, an overvalued exchange rate and a dependence
on remittances which may delay long term economic policies, especially if they cannot be
guaranteed due to economic °uctuations. Policies to divert remittances to more productive
sources may therefore be needed. Adams (1998), however, using data for Pakistan ¯nds
that external remittances do have an important statistical e®ect on the accumulation of
rural assets.
Empirical evidence on the savings of migrants is provided by Merkle and Zimmermann
(1992) who investigate the savings behaviour of guestworkers, most of whom are South-
ern European, living in Germany. They found that nearly all guestworkers had positive
savings, either a savings account in the home country or through remittances (which they
argue are a special form of savings if the migrant intends to return to their home country).
They found a negative relationship between the planned duration of residence in Germany
and remittances but this was not signi¯cant at the 5 per cent level. However, but they note
that guest-workers who return home early may well hold savings in their home country.
The conclude that their evidence supports Galor and Stark's hypothesis. However they
do not compare migrants' savings rates directly with those of natives.
22There is also some evidence to suggest that local savings rates (earnings invested into
savings in the host country) are higher for immigrants in Britain and France. Immigrants
living in Birmingham and Manchester had a savings rate around 2 per cent above the
British average in 1965 (Jones and Smith, 1970) and Granier and Marciano (1975) report
that French immigrants had a saving rate that was 50 per cent higher than a native with
a similar income level. Paine (1974) reported that Turkish migrants had a local savings
rate of 36 per cent, which was well above the national rate for developed economies. Al-
though our focus is on Europe, it is worth reporting McCormick and Wahba (2001) who
analyse the savings of return migrants to Egypt and the e®ect that these savings have on
the probability of entrepreneurship. They report that 29 per cent of their sample were
entrepreneurs after returning compared to 18 per cent before migrating. They argue that
savings accrued by the migrant while overseas account for much of this increase because
potential entrepreneurs are often liquidity constrained and savings can provide capital to
start a business (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). They also ¯nd that the acquisition of over-
seas work experience increases the probability that literate migrants become entrepreneurs,
which may re°ect skill acquisition while abroad.
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) provide supporting evidence to the Solow (1956) view
that richer countries have higher savings rates, whereas poorer countries tend to be those
with high rates of population growth. This may however suggest that those countries
that experience large immigration °ows may have lower growth rates. However these
variables are not signi¯cant in the regression for a sample of OECD countries. Mankiw
et al. (1992) also emphasise that account be taken of human capital di®erences in the
empirical speci¯cation. The results of this augmented Solow model indicate that human
capital is important in explaining wealth di®erences, even within OECD countries. They
also suggest that there may be a link between savings and human capital in that a higher
saving rate produces higher income in the steady state, which causes human capital levels
to increase even if the rate of human capital accumulation remains the same. They further
note that higher savings are associated with higher levels of total factor productivity.
233.6 Migration, Unemployment and Asymmetric Information
The role of history and initial conditions is highlighted in Bencivenga and Smith (1997) in
an exogenous growth model with a given proportion of high and low skilled workers. They
show how in a two-period overlapping generations model, migration from rural area to
the city determines unemployment. In contrast to Harris-Todaro (1970), unemployment
arises as a self-selection mechanism (only high skilled migrate and the skills are private
information). The authors show the possibilities of multiple steady states through a non-
monotonic relationship between current and future capital-labour ratios, and that if too
many migrate, adverse selection and unemployment can cause the saving rate to decrease.
Ortega (2000) o®ers a view of unemployment and immigration in a dynamic two-
country labour matching economy. Unemployment does not arise from the assumption
of wage rigidity in the developed area. In particular, the work o®ers a theoretical expla-
nation of why immigration might have positive e®ects on natives. The outcome is not
predetermined, given the existence of multiple equilibria (`no-migration', `partial' and 'to-
tal migration' equilibria) and equilibria are Pareto-ranked. In particular, the migration
equilibrium Pareto dominates the no-migration ones. Individuals in the disadvantaged
country11 are better o® since their decision to migrate positively a®ects their probability
to ¯nd a job. At the same time natives are better o® because migration positively a®ects
labour demand. Compared to some literature that concentrates on the competition be-
tween natives and migrants in economies with rigid wages, ¯xed capital and therefore a
¯xed number of job, Ortega shows how the arrival of immigrants in°uences positively the
job creation in the host country.
The inclusion of trade allows an explicit analysis of migration forces and unemployment
rates. Epifani and Gancia (2001) in a new economic geography framework model the links
between trade costs, migration and unemployment rates and show that the `core' region
gains from migration °ows. The bene¯ts are not only in terms of higher real wages, but
also in terms of lower unemployment rate12. As is typical in the Krugman framework, the
e®ects on unemployment rates through labour mobility are temporary. In fact, as trade
costs decrease, return migration speeds up the process of convergence.
11Their country has worse structural characteristics which determine more frictions.
12The decrease (increase) of the unemployment rate in the core (periphery) region is determined by a
decrease (increase) in the cost of intermediates (i.e. higher search costs for ¯rms).
24Katz and Stark (1987) discuss the situation where asymmetric information regarding
migrants' skills on the part of foreign employers may reduce the skill level of migrants
entering the receiving country. Katz and Stark (1989) extend this analysis and ¯nd that
the e®ect of asymmetric information on migration depends on the type of skill level that
is desired. For example if migration is desired at the lowest skill level then asymmetric
information could reduce both the quality and quantity of migrants or have no e®ect at all.
They also suggest that as employers discover the true productivity of migrant workers over
time, the quality and quantity of migrants might actually increase since this lessens the
impact that group averaging has on deterring the migration of the highly skilled. Beine
et al (2001) discuss the issue of screening further.
3.7 The Welfare State and Demographic Considerations
It is important to determine whether immigrants are more or less likely to be recipients
of welfare payments than natives, particularly if low skilled immigrants are attracted
by the relatively generous social welfare payments that are o®ered in some countries.
Evidence suggests that immigrants are less likely to be social welfare recipients, and when
they do receive assistance, these are typically lower than those received by natives with
similar characteristics (OECD, 1997). However, Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) ¯nd that
the probability that an immigrant to the US receives state bene¯ts has risen since the
1970s. This can be explained by the lower levels of human capital and poorer English
language skills of more recent immigrant cohorts. Borjas and Hilton (1996) also report
that immigrant households are more likely to be bene¯t recipients than native households,
but ¯nd that immigrants' welfare recipient rates fall the longer they stay in the host
country.
However, in order to examine the ¯scal impact of immigration more fully, the amount
received in immigrant tax receipts should be compared with social welfare payments to
immigrants. Lalonde and Topel (1997) survey US evidence and report that immigrants are
net contributors, although most of this evidence relates to the 1970s, since when average
immigrant skills have decreased and hence a larger proportion are below the poverty line.
They therefore conclude that the net bene¯ts associated with recent immigration may be
smaller than for previous cohorts. Gott and Johnston (2002) also suggest that immigrants
25make a positive net contribution to the UK economy. They estimate that in 1999/2000,
immigrants to the UK contributed $31.2bn in taxes and received $28.8bn in bene¯ts and
state services. Furthermore, intergenerational considerations should be taken into account,
and if this is done the contribution made by immigrants may be an underestimate since
second generation immigrants are also likely to be net tax payers.
Canova and Ravn (2000) examine the macroeconomic consequences for West Germany
of German uni¯cation using a dynamic general equilibrium model. They argue that this
event is similar to a mass migration of low-skilled workers holding no capital into a foreign
country. In the absence of a welfare state, West to East transfers raise distortionary tax
rates and result in an investment boom and depressed output. Winners are Western owners
of capital and high-skilled workers and migrants. With the welfare state the investment
boom disappears and the recession is prolonged. Winners are now con¯ned to migrants
and unskilled workers in the former GDR.
Sinn (2002) focuses on the potential adverse ¯scal consequences of migration that may
result from EU enlargement. He expects there to be signi¯cant East-West migration mostly
induced by the relatively large wage di®erentials that currently exist and this could produce
some of the positive aspects of migration that we have discussed previously. However, if
migration occurs as a result of the welfare programmes o®ered by Western countries, then
this could create competition between these countries to deter Eastern migrants from
entering. The overall outcome of this process could therefore be the erosion of the welfare
state. To prevent this from occurring, Sinn (2002) recommends the harmonisation of
welfare systems (which may be too expensive), selective migration policies or limiting the
access of migrants to the welfare system.
Many OECD countries face the problem of an ageing population. For example, in the
recently published 2001 United Kingdom Census, it was reported that for the ¯rst time,
the population aged over 60 was greater than the population aged under 16. In addition
to lower fertility and mortality rates, there has been a trend towards early retirement,
especially among skilled workers. This means that several countries, especially those where
pensioners are reliant on state pensions, are now confronted with a pensions crisis. It has
therefore been suggested that immigration could help to alleviate this `demographic time-
bomb' since immigrants are typically younger and have higher fertility rates. Furthermore,
26Zimmermann (1995) reports that there is strong migration potential from developing and
Eastern European countries because many of these countries have growing populations.
However, the current level of immigration will be unable to sustain the level of the working
age population since it has been estimated that a net migration of around 1.5 million
individuals per annum is required in order to keep the working population in the EU
constant until 2050 (United Nations, 2000).
4 Migration and Endogenous Growth
A vast theoretical and empirical literature has emerged since the 1980s which has trans-
formed the way economists think about growth. The pioneer of this research was Paul
Romer (1986, 1990). New growth theory contrasts with the earlier neoclassical or old
growth theory of Solow (1956) which invoked exogenous technical change to explain sus-
tained long-term growth. By contrast the focus of the new endogenous growth (EG) theory
is on how the consumption and savings decisions of households, the investment decisions
of ¯rms, and public policy in various forms, determine long-term growth. Whilst the neo-
classical model could be described as a model with long-run growth, the new literature
o®ers a number of possible models of long-run growth.
The EG literature can be usefully be divided into three broad strands: the ¯rst builds
on Romer (1986), is closest to the classical tradition and emphasises capital accumulation
as the engine of growth with capital broadly de¯ned to include human and physical com-
ponents. The second sees endogenous growth driven by the accumulation of human capital
(Lucas, 1988). In the third broad strand of the literature, following Romer (1990) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991), the discovery of new goods and of new processes provides
the engine of growth. R&D activity provides blueprints for these innovations and a feature
of this literature is the attempt to understand the economic forces that drive R&D. This
section ¯rst reviews papers that draw upon this literature in order to assess the impact of
migration on long-run endogenous growth.
4.1 Growth Driven by Capital Stock
Reichlin and Rustichini (1993) study the impact of migration in a two-period overlapping
generations model of consumers with free trade, perfect capital mobility. Following Romer
27(1986), the authors assume that the level of technology is an increasing function of the
aggregate stock of capital (i.e., knowledge is a public good) through a learning-by-doing
mechanism. Due to the presence of externalities, the equilibrium is characterized by a con-
tinuous °ow of migration from low wage to high wage countries. The °ow of migrants from
the poor to the rich country does not stop since the assumption of perfect capital mobility
(i.e. interest rate equalization) makes the high wage country the one with a higher capital
labor ratio and this advantage increases over time in the presence of positive externalities.
The existence of a scale e®ect of the labour force is the key, even if controversial, element
of the model. The two countries are assumed identical in terms of technology, but they
di®er in terms of initial stocks of factors of production.
In the ¯rst part of the paper, they show the con¯gurations of the migration patterns
in a homogeneous labor framework. They then discuss the case of heterogeneous labour
where the scale e®ect (the crucial one in the homogenous labour case) may be partially or
totally o®-set by a `composition e®ect'{ac hange in the ratio of skilled to unskilled in the
two countries. In the latter case, a °ow reversal in migration patterns takes place. The
size e®ect is captured by a technology which is positively a®ected by the aggregate stock of
capital, as in Romer (1986). Young individuals are endowed with di®erent predisposition
to emigrate so that a given proportion of workers will move. In the model with unskilled
and skilled workers, this proportion is assumed equal to the fraction of agents who are
willing to qualify as skilled workers. The composition e®ect in°uences the relative position
of a country and gives a possible explanation of why a country which, at some point in
time, is a sending country, may become a receiving country in the future, even if there are
large positive externalities. The main condition of the reversal, which is also a condition
for convergence in the growth rates, is a balanced composition of skilled and unskilled
workers.
To sum up the main points of this work, the authors show the positive e®ects of
migration determined by pure size e®ects. On the other hand, with high and low skill
workers, the continuous °ow of migrants a®ects the ratio of skilled and unskilled and if
the °ow is proportionately larger in the unskilled labour sector then migration, through
the composition e®ect, may penalize the receiving country.
284.2 Growth Driven by Human Capital
Walz (1995) uses a 2-bloc endogenous growth model to address the e®ects of migration
on both host and source countries. He provides conditions under which a brain drain is
bene¯cial for the source economy, avoiding the use of pure size e®ects. He provides an
explanation of skill formation and migration decision in an endogenous growth model with
individuals living a ¯nite period of time. In particular, individuals choose whether they
will invest in education or work in the unskilled sector. A key assumption of the model
is given by the presence of two types of agents with di®erent advantages in the education
process. Clearly, agents with an advantage in the human capital formation process have
higher incentives to invest in education and migration acts as a screening device. Since
the cost to migrate are the same for both categories, the expected bene¯ts to migrate are
higher for workers with a greater ability in the education process. Two cases may arise.
In case 1, the expected zero bene¯t condition is satis¯ed before all individuals with an
advantage in the education process (i.e. type 1 agent) have chosen to become skilled. In
case 2 all type 1 and some type 2 individuals invest in education. In contrast with Beine
et al. (2001), the author explicitly considers two countries developing the analysis of the
dynamic e®ects of migration in the source (low wage) as well as in the host (high wage)
economy.
The central idea in the paper is that migration a®ects the growth rate of the economies
by altering the composition of the labour force in each country. Each country specializes
in the production of a consumption good. In each country, besides the consumption
sectors, an education sector exists. The evolution of knowledge depends positively on the
average human capital which is the result of migration decisions. The author highlights
the positive e®ects of opening up the economies for individuals in both countries via a
decreasing price level and a rising real income. If the growth of the source country does
not decrease, migration can make everybody better o®. Moreover, if migration increases
the overall growth rate, the positive dynamic positive e®ects may o®set the negative static
e®ects for the host country.
The role of history and initial conditions is also highlighted in Premer and Walz (1994).
In this paper the authors explain regions/countries divergence through an endogenous
growth model in which regional growth occurs due to learning by doing and where the
29allocation of skilled workers is endogenously determined.
Haque and Kim (1994) concentrate on the e®ects of high skilled migration in the source
economy. In a two-country endogenous growth model with heterogeneous agents13, the
authors show that the migration of skilled labour may have negative e®ects on income and
growth in the sending economy. The heteogeneous individuals live two periods. In the
¯rst period they may decide to invest in education while in period two they can choose
their location. The two countries di®er in terms of government policies and possibly
technology. These di®erences explain migration °ows which will result in a truncation of
the distribution of ability in the source country. As in Walz (1995), there is a tendency
of individuals with higher ability to migrate. This generates a permanent decrease of
the growth rate in the home country which is proportional to the fraction of population
that has migrated, while the e®ects in the host country depend on the evolution of the
ratio of average human capital of the two countries. Given the theoretical framework just
described, the authors derive implications for policies to a®ect the level of human capital
distinguishing the case of a closed from the one of an open economy.
4.3 Growth Driven by R&D
Lundborg and Segerstrom (1999, 2002) examine a quality-ladders model of economic
growth based on a North-South model in Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 12).
In such a model, growth is driven by improvements in product quality. In each period,
¯rms engage in an R&D race to become the quality leader by hiring R&D workers. A
¯rm that wins the race becomes the only producer in that period. All ¯rms stay in the
R&D race, and every leading ¯rm will be replaced by another. Any ¯rm's probability
of becoming the leader depends positively on its own R&D e®ort and negatively on the
aggregate e®ort made by all ¯rms. Since all ¯rms are identical, they all make the same
R&D investments and face the same probability of becoming the product leader.
The world is made up of two regions called North and South. The high-quality products
of the North are called `high-tech', only Northern ¯rms can produce them. The products
of the South are called `low-tech'. The Northern ¯rms could produce them but they will
not do so because production of high-tech products is more pro¯table. Consumers spend
13The positive growth in this model is achieved through a positive intergenerational externality.
30a ¯xed part of their expenditure on commodities of each region. They bene¯t from the
innovation in both regions through falling commodity prices, therefore the rate of growth
of real expenditure is identical in both regions. Southern welfare levels are a constant
fraction of northern welfare levels. There is a constant incentive to migrate.
Consider ¯rst what happens when some Southern consumers/workers die. To start
with this means a reduction of consumer expenditure in the South.14 Therefore demand
and production of Northern commodities falls and the relative wage of Northern consumers
falls. This leads to a fall in Northern expenditure. The fall of expenditures leads to a
fall in the growth rate because there are reduced incentives to invest in R&D. All these
circumstances reduce Northern welfare. Southern welfare is a®ected negatively by the
fall in growth rate, but it is a®ected positively through the increase in the relative wage.
As far as workers|who receive labour income|in the South are concerned the latter
e®ect dominates the former in simulation evidence presented by the authors. As far as
capitalists|who own the stock value of ¯rms|in the South are concerned the growth
e®ect dominates.
Now consider the e®ect of migration from the South to the North. An R&D worker
is assumed to be more productive in the North than in the South, therefore the growth
potential in the world economy increases when labour moves to the North. We also have
the e®ect of a population decrease in the South as discussed in the previous paragraph.
In addition we have the impact of the labour supply increase in the North, that puts
further pressure on the wages in the North. Firms in the North and South increase
R&D expenditure. But in simulations the resulting increase in growth is not su±cient to
make migration bene¯cial to Northern consumers. Northern workers are worse a®ected
than Northern capitalists. Southern workers bene¯t from migration; the incentives to
migrate are reduced. Thus the welfare e®ects of migration can be divided into static e®ects
from changes in wages and the terms of trade, and dynamic e®ects from higher growth.
Static distributional e®ects are as the previous section { Northern workers (excluding
new immigrants) and Southern capitalists lose and Northern capitalists, Southern workers
and migrants gain. Workers North and South gain from increased growth, but Northern
capitalists can lose because more R&D activity intensi¯es competition and squeezes pro¯ts.
14It is not clear in the paper what happens to the wealth of the dead consumers.
31Groups Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis
Northern Capitalists Winners Winners or Losers
Northern Workers Losers Winners
Southern Capitalists Losers Winners
Southern Workers Winners Winners
Migrants Winners Winners
Table 1: Winners and Losers under skilled Migration: Static and Dynamic Aspects
Table 1 summarises these results on winners and losers. The net e®ect of migration is
naturally sensitive to parameter values and to the speci¯cation of the model.
In a 2-country, 3-sector model, Bretschger (2001) challenges a main result of the ex-
isting literature on the impact of migration on growth, namely the positive e®ects of
unskilled migration given an elasticity of substitution between skilled/unskilled greater
than 1 (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Moreover, the author shows the role of countries'
shares in world goods markets, a role neglected by previous works15. Using an expansion in
varieties framework, the author analyzes the impact of the supply of skilled and unskilled
workers on the growth rate in open economies. In the medium term, the three sectors
(traditional, high tech and R&D sectors), are spread in the two economies, but given
increasing returns in the R&D sectors, the ¯nal outcome will be one of full specialization.
After presenting empirical evidence supporting his model, the author considers two
versions. In a ¯rst version, he shows the e®ects of migration in an expanding varieties in
consumption, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991). An increase in skilled migration has
unambiguously positive e®ects on growth, while the e®ects of unskilled migration depends
on the elasticity of substitution of skilled and unskilled in both the high tech and the
traditional sector. In particular, the smaller the country, the higher the possibility of neg-
ative e®ects on growth of unskilled migration. In a second version of the model, Bretschger
15The interdependence between immigration and country size works in the following way: small
economies can sell additional goods without a®ecting world prices too much. In particular, if we as-
sume an increase in the supply of unskilled workers, this will determine an expansion in the unskilled
sector ¯rst which is usually the slow growing one. In this case, the negative e®ects of growth determined
by low skilled migration is stronger for small size economies.
32considers the case of an expanding varieties in inputs into production, highlighting the role
of the reward for the inventions of new designs (R&D sector). In this version he assumes
varieties to serve as intermediate goods for a capital input and he shows how migration
of unskilled has unambiguously negative e®ects on the growth rate. At the same time,
the growth e®ects of an equi-proportionate immigration of unskilled and skilled depends
again on the elasticity of substitution and the countries' size.
To sum up, the main ¯ndings of Bretschger (2001) are: positive e®ects in the host
country of high skill migration and negative impact of unskilled labour on growth. A
corollary of these results is that migration of the high skilled negatively a®ects growth in
the source economy, perfectly in line with the main-stream literature on brain drain. The
case of Switzerland with its policy that discriminate foreign skilled labour is introduced
to support the author's thesis.
The importance of the skill composition of migrants is also stressed by Levine et al
(2002). They revisit the work of Borjas (1995) and extend his analysis in a number of
directions. First, they study the immigration surplus in the context of a general equilib-
rium model in which capital is endogenous and the welfare of the indigenous population is
set out explicitly. Second, they introduce several sectors into the model so that changing
the skill composition leads to changes in sector shares. Third and related to the second
development, they introduce dynamics and develop a model with long-term endogenous
growth driven by R&D. The result is that growth e®ects on the Immigration Surplus come
to dominate the purely static e®ects in the original analysis of Borjas, but they are not
su±cient to eliminate the emergence of losers among the section of natives competing with
immigrants in the labour market.
4.4 Migration and Growth: Empirical Evidence
Despite the positive e®ect that immigration can have on growth, immigration is typi-
cally not included as an explanatory variable in the avalanche of (cross section) growth
regressions that have emerged following Barro (1991). Even those studies that attempt
to control for virtually every conceivable covariate e.g., Levine and Renalt (1992) and
Hoover and Perez (2001) do not explicitly control for the e®ect of immigration. Rather,
they include the population growth rate of which net migration is just one component,
33although this variable is not very signi¯cant in their regressions. On the other hand Sachs
and Warner (1997) include the growth of the economically active population minus the
population growth rate, which they ¯nd to be positive and almost signi¯cant at the 5 per
cent level. Therefore we must look to other evidence to demonstrate the importance of
immigration per se on growth.
A possible reason for the relative absence of immigration as an economic explanation
for growth was suggested by Neal and Uselding (1972) who believed that economists take
the growth rate of the labour force as a ¯xed parameter even in periods when the amount
of immigration varied. However, there is considerable evidence from the economic history
literature as to the importance of immigration, and of factor movements in general, on
growth and convergence.
Kindleberger (1967) was one of the main advocates of the view that immigration was
the main factor behind the remarkable rates of economic growth witnessed in the post-war
period in Europe. Taylor (1999) suggests that his empirical model for the period 1870-1914
\ certainly indicates the importance of the three classical factors, and the indisputably
mobile labor and capital, as the basis of economic growth" (p. 1642). Focusing solely on
Argentina over this period, Taylor (1997) ¯nds that immigration drove down real wages
in the country by around 25 per cent and caused a 19 per cent increase in GDP. Given
the huge in°ow of people over this period, Taylor (1997) describes Argentina as an ideal
test case for analysing the economic impact of immigration. Neal and Uselding (1972)
estimate that the 1912 US physical capital stock would have been between 13 per cent
and 42 per cent lower had it not been for immigration into the US economy and that its
proportionate e®ect on human capital would have been at least as great.
Other attempts to quantify the magnitude of these e®ects used fairly crude techniques.
For example, Askari (1974) simply multiplied the annual contribution of labour to growth
by the percentage of foreign workers in the labour force. He found that the impact of
immigrants on growth rates in the EEC was fairly small. The largest e®ects were found in
Luxembourg, where immigrants were estimated to have increased annual growth rates by
an average of around 7 per cent (0.2 percentage points per year) between 1960 and 1970.
The impact of immigrants on the annual growth rates of Belgium, France, Germany and
the Netherlands was much smaller since immigrants typically contributed less than 0.05
34percentage points. Other studies include that of Gallais-Hamonno (1977) who estimated
that immigrants contributed around 5 per cent to France's GNP.
Blattner and Sheldon (1989) take a di®erent approach in that they specify a pro-
duction function for Switzerland that distinguishes between domestic and foreign labour.
They apply a growth accounting framework to isolate the contribution of immigrants
to output growth rates, productivity and per capita GDP. They estimate that foreign
labour accounted for around 0.3 percentage points of the 2.7 per cent average growth
rates that Switzerland experienced between 1961 and 1982. The other contributions to
output growth were domestic employment (0.1 percentage points), hours of work (-0.2
percentage points), capital (0.8 percentage points) and technical change (1.7 percentage
points). However, they ¯nd that foreign employment had a negative e®ect on both pro-
ductivity growth and per capita growth over this period, which they explain by the lower
output elasticity of foreign workers, possibly as a result of the jobs in which immigrants
are typically found.
5 Policy Implications
The East-West European migration that will follow the pending enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union creates one of the most interesting migration-policy `laboratories' in the world.
In a continent, like Europe, where popular concern about social cohesion used to be par-
ticularly strong, labour-migration channels were virtually closed. Today, the transition
toward a fully integrated area and the rising demand for foreign labour are changing the
terms of the debate. The work presented in this survey suggests some guidelines for the
removal of the restrictions to labour mobility. A well-known result of the migration liter-
ature, namely the prediction that bene¯ts and losses from integration will be distributed
unevenly among the individual factors and across generations, deserves special attention.
In order to focus on the policy implications of the papers surveyed in this work, we
need to summarize the experience gathered in previous accession rounds and from the
European migration °ows since World War II. As described in the literature, periods of
labour shortages such as in the 1960's induced active recruitment policies in some European
countries. This openness had been followed by a period of restrained migration. Since the
fall of the Berlin wall, all CEECs now grant their citizens the right to move in and out,
35and from that time East-West migration started to gain particular attention. However
EU countries still maintained barriers to immigration, e.g. some have migration quotas.
Di®erent empirical studies , show that low immigration ¯gures which can be traced
back to restrictive immigration policies in member states. The gap in terms of per capita
incomes, factor endowments and the state of technology that is expected to last for a
long period of time suggest an increase in the °ow of migrants once a full integration
into the EU is complete. Despite no clear implications of a removal of the restrictions
to labor mobility, concerns are often expressed that immigration will interest mainly low
skilled migrants given the distinct gap in higher education enrolment rates. Moreover, the
di±culties in transferring human capital acquired in the East to EU labour market is also
under analysis. Other empirical studies end up with di®erent conclusions and show that
high ability workers are the more likely to migrate.
The debate has focused on the role of institutions and governments as mechanisms
which, can ¯rst regulate migration °ows and their composition and second mitigate the
potential negative impact of immigration in the host countries of immigrants. On the one
hand, studies in favour of migration stress its role in partially o®setting the slower growing
or declining population as well as easing the skilled labour shortages in speci¯c sectors.
On the other hand, opponents point to the impact on native unemployment and wages.
Here we attempt to synthesize the policy implications of the papers included in the survey
with respect to three themes: i) What are the static and dynamic consequences of an
increase in the foreign labour supply? ii) What is the relation between skilled/unskilled
migration and economic development in the source and host countries? (iii) What role
can governments play?
We summarize the main ¯ndings in terms of possible gains of migration for the host
countries and the distribution of these bene¯ts and policies to stimulate growth and welfare
in both the source and the host country16.
² Previous surveys on this theme and Borjas (1994, 1995, 1999 and 2001), focus on
the static e®ects of migration. Borjas (1994 and 1995) ends up with clear policy
recommendations. In an heterogeneous labour market framework, he looks at the
16Di®erent models have been proposed and the choice among the di®erent policy designs for labour
migration depends, strongly, on the economic model we believe is appropriate for the EU economies.
36original mix of skilled and unskilled workers in order to measure the so-called immi-
gration surplus and analyse the role of possible complementarities between migrants
and native factors. However, Borjas found a small impact of migration on US GDP
and a not-insigni¯cant redistribution from labour to capital labour market. For
these reasons his earlier work suggests a pessimistic outcome from active recruit-
ment policies. However his "greasing the wheels" argument in Borjas (2001) that
immigration injects into the economy a group of highly mobile self-selected indi-
viduals, ready to move to exploit economic opportunities in di®erent areas, is more
optimistic. Whether the resulting immigration surplus is signi¯cant or not, win-
ners`and losers remain and this suggests that compensating redistributive policies
among immigrants, domestic workers and domestic capital owners may be necessary.
² A similar policy is suggested by Steineck (1996), which concludes in favour of poten-
tial positive e®ects of migration, unequally distributed between native population.
Again the need for compensation mechanism between winners and losers are raised.
² As far as unemployment is concerned, the literature reviewed shows only the possibil-
ity of short run e®ects of migration on the unemployment rate. The work of Ortega
(2000) o®ers a theoretical explanation of why immigration might have positive ef-
fects on natives in terms of a lower unemployment rate, but overall the literature
does not consider unemployment as a major issue in designing immigration policies.
² Looking at the dynamic aspects of the EU enlargement, (growth and economic de-
velopment), the debate focuses on the role of migration of high skilled and concerns
of a possible `brain drain' in less developed countries. Growth may be driven by
pure size e®ects, human capital and R&D and the policy prescriptions are strongly
related to the mechanism generating growth.
² If we decide to take into account the possible e®ects of immigration on innovation
and technological change, we obtain the following results. Lundborg and Segerstrom
(1999, 2002) in a two-country endogenous growth model with an homogeneous labour
force, show that the representative agent loses from large immigration quotas, de-
spite a positive growth e®ect, whilst the population of the sending country gains.
Given this negative result for natives in the host country, the authors consider dif-
37ferent policy recommendations. A migration tax lowers the incentive to migrate but
native workers would have been better o® in a no migration equilibrium. Migration
incentives can be a®ected by other policies. In the Lundborg and Segerstrom frame-
work, even if an R&D subsidy in the host enhances overall growth, an R&D subsidy
in the sending country has the added positive e®ect of reducing migration incentives
by lowering the international utility di®erences among workers.
² Moving to a world with di®erent skills, one of the most relevant ¯ndings is that mi-
gration of high skilled positively a®ects the level of human capital in the host country
and, following predictions from economic theory, the migration of high skilled has
unambiguous positive e®ects on the growth rate in the host country.
² In a model where growth is driven by pure size e®ect, Reichlin and Rustichini (1993)
suggest an active migration policy whilst in a world with di®erent skills they also
look at the composition of migration and they recommend policies which guarantee
a proportional °ow of skilled and unskilled migrants.
² Policies that favour immigration of more skilled individuals are adviced by Bretschger
(2001). Looking at other countries experience (e.g., Canada), the quality of migrants
can be in°uenced by adopting a points system to meet EU labour market needs. At
the same time, di®erences in the quality of immigrants can also be explained in terms
of di®erences in the national-origin mix of migrants and selection mechanisms based
on the country of origin can be considered as well. In fact the quality of migrants
also with regard to human capital transferability, depends on the type of skill and
the characteristics of the host and sending countries (e.g., language, institutions,
etc).17
² The positive e®ects of high skilled migration is also stressed by Levine et al. (2002).
They revisit the standard Borjas analysis (Borjas, 1995) extending it in di®erent
directions. Looking at the dynamic aspects, the authors show that in an endogenous
growth framework, the positive e®ects of high skilled migration are magni¯ed. At
the same time, distributional e®ects still dominate. In the simulations, the highly
skilled loose even if overall population gain from migration.
17See Bauer and Zimmermann (2000).
38² Concerns over skilled migration has been raised by the literature on `brain drain'
in the source countries. Governments of the sending countries in favour of growth
promoting policy, should take the `human capital °ight' into account. To the extent
that ability is an important determinant of growth, Haque and Kim (1994) suggest
that subsidies on education in an open economy can have negative impact on the
growth rate of the source country. On the other hand, some of the papers surveyed
above on the brain drain/gain literature stress the positive e®ects of opening up
the economies for individuals in both countries. Another important bene¯t of inter-
national migration for the source country are remittances, although there is some
doubt regarding the extent to which these payments are used for productive pur-
poses. Clearly, di®erent policy recommendation follow if we believe either in a brain
drain or in a brain gain e®ect.
6 Conclusions
This survey has reviewed a large number of theoretical models that consider various aspects
of the immigration process, focusing in particular on the e®ect that immigration can have
on growth rates. In general, these models indicate that migration should increase growth,
both in terms of endogenous and short-run growth. This is particularly the case if the
in°ow of workers consists mainly of the highly skilled. However, the out°ow of skilled
workers from sending countries might have a detrimental e®ect on those countries i.e.
the brain drain but without some authors argue that the migration of the highly skilled
can actually bring about positive e®ects in that it is likely to encourage human capital
formation in the source country.
There are relatively few reliable econometric estimates of the contribution that migra-
tion makes to raising growth rates, but no shortage of empirical evidence on its importance
in various time periods for di®erent countries. The survey also contains a discussion of the
policy options available for both sending and receiving countries, in the light of the empir-
ical evidence and theoretical ¯ndings. With reference to the upcoming enlargement of the
EU, it is suggested that given that migration from Eastern to Western Europe may well
have positive growth e®ects, especially if migrants are high-skilled, an overly restrictive
migration policy may constrain the overall growth of the region.
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A Elasticities from Hammermesh
Using usual notation, consider a CES production function
Y =[ °L½ +( 1¡ °)K½]
1
½ (A.1)















Then using Shepherd's Lemma the conditional demand for labour L(Y;w;r) can be ob-
tained. Then ´LL in Hammermesh is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the








where ¾ = 1






mermesh arrives at the conclusion that the empirical evidence suggests ¡´LL 2 [0:15;0:75]
48with a best guess at ¡´LL =0 :3. From (A.3) with capital's share at 0.3, this suggests
¾ = 1, i.e. Cobb-Douglas technology!
In the analysis of Borjas e = @lnw
@lnL keeping capital ¯xed. With C-D technology this
means e =( 1¡ °)=0 :3.
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